改革如何得以维系?--拉美结构性改革中执政领袖的策略选择与改革命运

Executives’ Strategy and the Implementation of Structural Reform in Latin America

拉美国家的执政领袖作为"行为者",在结构性改革中的主观能动性最终决定了改革的命运。具体而言,执政领袖如果顺从所属政党或被利益集团捕获,则会使改革失败;如果他们采取一定程度的协商和妥协,则会让改革变得缓慢却更持久;如果他们忽视协调,武断决策和收买精英,则会让改革得以短期实施,却不利于改革的可持续性。文章通过控制比较和过程追踪发现,危机下发动改革具有客观迫切性,而政治资本、既有制度等条件限制了执政领袖的操作空间。执政领袖的选择首先影响了改革的第一层结果,即改革形式是激进还是渐进,同时也影响了改革的第二层结果,表现为改革的最终命运是被抛弃还是可持续。

What political conditions facilitate market-oriented structural reform in Latin America? Research conducted in the past suggested that neoliberal policies are inherently unpopular and consequently dependent upon the existence of politically insulated executives. This study reassesses a broader set of factors including economic circumstances, institutional conditions, electoral pressures, pluralist constraints, international linkages and suggests that reform outcomes have been linked to the strategies adopted by the executive and how he interacts with the opposition. Through a qualitative investigation of tracing the reform process, we draw on case studies on three possible approaches in generating support and holding off the opposition. The first is obedience: the executive cedes to the demands of the party and interest groups, and it might placate tensions in their relations but at the expense of reform implementation. The second is accommodation: the executive negotiates some compromise for the consent to implement reforms, and such consultation makes the reform slow but endurable. The third is ignorance: the executive simply neglects the concerns of the opposition and attempts to implement the reforms by shortcuts. However, it engenders instability and implementation difficulties. Where executives and other stakeholders have succeeded in negotiating, the result has been an enlarged process of reform.