股权制衡度、高管激励偏好与企业并购绩效

Equity Balance,Executive Incentive Preference and Corporate M&A Performance

股权制衡度作为股权结构的重要内容,是参与公司治理进而影响企业并购效率的关键要素。以2007—2017年沪深两市A股发生并购行为的企业为样本,采用Edwards和Lambert的全效应调节模型,实证检验股权制衡度对企业并购绩效的影响以及高管激励的中介效应。研究发现,股权制衡度与企业并购绩效间存在倒“U”型关系,股权制衡度通过高管激励促成与企业并购绩效间的倒“U”型关系,高管激励在股权制衡度与企业并购绩效之间起到中介传导作用,该结论在非国有企业中依然成立,且在非国有企业中股权激励能够正向调节股权制衡度与企业并购绩效之间的关系,较高的市场化水平比较低的市场化水平更能有效发挥高管激励的中介作用。

As an important part of the shareholding structure,equity balance is a key factor affecting corporate governance and thus affecting the efficiency of M&A.Taking the enterprises of M&A activities of Shanghai and Shenzhen stocks in 2007-2017 as samples,the full-effect adjustment model of Edwards and Lambert was used to empirically test the impact of equity balance on corporate M&A performance and the mediating effect of executive incentives.The study finds that there is an inverted“U”relationship between equity balance and corporate M&A performance.The equity balance is promoted by executives and the“U”relationship between M&A performance,executive incentives in equity balance and mergers and acquisitions.The performance plays an intermediary role.This conclusion is still established in non-state-owned enterprises,and in non-state-owned enterprises,equity incentives can positively adjust the relationship between equity balance and corporate merger performance;higher marketization level comparison The low level of marketization can effectively play the intermediary role of executive incentives.