机构投资者能抑制盈余管理吗?--基于退出威胁视角的经验证据

Can Institutional Investors Mitigate Earnings Management?--Evidence from Exit Threat Perspective

退出威胁是股东参与公司治理的重要方式。本文以2010?2017年A股上市公司为样本,检验机构投资者的退出威胁与企业盈余管理之间的关系。结果显示:机构投资者能够抑制企业的真实盈余管理,而对应计盈余管理的影响并不显著;机构投资者退出威胁能够降低真实和应计盈余管理水平。进一步考虑机构投资者异质性发现,相比敏感型机构投资者,抗压型机构投资者退出威胁更可能降低企业真实盈余管理水平;当管理层的薪酬对股价越敏感时,机构投资者退出威胁的作用越大;机构投资者退出威胁的影响效应在民营企业中更显著。本文的研究结论为认识我国机构投资者,尤其是以QFII和社保基金为代表的抗压型机构投资者在公司治理中的作用提供了新的思路。

Recent research shows that exit threat is a new channel of corporate governance.In this paper,we take the A-share listed companies in 2010?2017 as a sample to examine whether institutional investors exacerbate or mitigate earnings management.The results show below:Institutional investors can inhibit accrual earnings management.Furthermore,the exit threat by institutional investors can decrease both accrual and real earnings management.However,when consider the heterogeneity o f institutional investors,only the pressure resistant institutional investors can decrease real earnings management by exit threat.Last,we find when the management’s salary and firm value are highly correlated,this effect can be amplified;non-state enterprises perform better on this mitigation.Our findings show a new idea in the role of Chinese institutional investors in corporate governance,especially the pressure resistant institutional investors like QFII and social insurance fund.