定价权与收益共享对RFID投资激励的影响

The impact of pricing power and revenue sharing on incentives for RFID adoption

本文针对采用RFID技术消除零售商商品错放,但会增加额外成本的问题,建立了确定性需求下投资\不投资RFID时批发价契约和收益共享契约下生产商与零售商的收益模型,以探究定价权及收益共享对链上成员投资RFID动机的影响,其中链上成员可能没有或有定价权(仅生产商或零售商有,或二者都有)。研究发现:没有定价权时,生产商与零售商的投资激励不一致,且收益共享总能使零售商受损,但能使生产商在批发价较低时受益,且总能加强其投资意愿。再者,有定价权时,他们能承担的标签成本相同,且与集中式决策一致,但收益共享与定价权并不影响他们的投资意愿。然而,与没有定价权相比,收益共享与定价权对生产商投资意愿的影响取决于商品的错放率。并且,当生产商享有的共享比例与其定价权相等时,收益共享能协调供应链。最后,与没有定价权相比,生产商与零售商不能同时从拥有定价权中获益。

Retailers can suffer from inventory misplacement errors for various reasons.To eliminate these errors,they can adopt Radio Frequency Identification(RFID)technology.RFID adoption seems to hold the most potential for the retailer,but is a costly tool for the manufacturer who is at the best position to put on the tags,which can cause incentive issues in the supply chain.In this paper,we attempt to further understand the impact of RFID adoption on firms’profitability by investigating the firms’pricing power and the additional incentive scheme(i.e.,revenue sharing).To this end,we consider a supply chain system,which consists of a manufacturer and a retailer who suffers from inventory misplacement error.The demand is deterministic,linear and downward-sloping.The two firms can reach an agreement through wholesale price contracts or revenue sharing contracts in both with pricing power and without cases,where the wholesale price is set by the manufacturer,or by the retailer,or by both via a generalized Nash bargaining(GNB)scheme in the former case,whereas the wholesale price is exogenous in the latter case.We first derive the corresponding equilibrium quantity and profit of the centralized supply chain with RIFD and without,then explore the condition under which the centralized system benefits from RFID adoption,which serves as a first-best benchmark.Then we examine the decentralized supply chain,under which the manufacturer and the retailer individually make their decisions.Especially,we apply backward induction to derive the equilibrium wholesale price,the quantity,and the two firms’profits under wholesale price contracts and revenue sharing contracts when the firms can possess pricing power or not with RFID and without.To comprehend the effect of revenue sharing,we compare the equilibrium results under wholesale price contracts and revenue sharing contracts.In addition,we investigate the conditions under which the two firms can benefit from RFID adoption by comparing their profits between with RFID and without.Furthermore,we examine our model to characterize the effect of the key model inputs,e.g.,the misplaced rate,revenue share,bargaining power and tagging cost,on the equilibrium wholesale price,order quantity and the two firms’profits.Finally,to further realize the effect of pricing power and revenue sharing on supplier’s incentive for RFID adoption,we compare the main equilibrium results between the centralized system and decentralized system.Based on our analysis,we obtain the following key insights.First,we show that without pricing power,the incentives of the manufacturer and the retailer to adopt RFID are misaligned,and revenue sharing always hurts the retailer but benefits the manufacturer when the wholesale price is low,yet it always enhances the manufacturer’s willingness to adopt RFID.However,with pricing power,the two firms’incentives for RFID adoption are perfectly aligned,and are identical to that of the centralized case,but neither pricing power nor revenue sharing affects the two firms’incentives.Moreover,compared with no pricing power case,the impact of pricing power and revenue sharing on the manufacturer’s incentives depends on the misplaced rate of the product in the retailer’s store.Furthermore,revenue sharing contracts coordinate the supply chain when the manufacturer’s revenue share is exactly equal to her pricing power.Finally,compared with no pricing power case,the two firms cannot simultaneously be better off from possessing pricing power.