供应链间寡头竞争背景的大型客机研制主制造商:供应商超界博弈模型

Super-bond game of main manufacturer:Supplier during the development of large civil aircraft under oligopoly competition among supply chain

针对大型客机寡头供应链之间以及供应链内部主制造商与不同供应商之间存在的复杂博弈问题,首先根据产品在市场中的供需关系构建了寡头供应链之间的博弈模型,并在此基础上梳理出了供应链内部参与主体决策变量对寡头供应链均衡状态的影响性关系;然后根据不同供应商之间以及不同供应商与主制造商之间存在的帕累托均衡、合作均衡以及纳什均衡等多种均衡关系,建立了大型客机供应链内部参与主体之间的博弈模型;最后综合考虑供应链内外各个博弈主体,构建了供应链间寡头竞争背景下的大型客机研制主制造商-供应商超界博弈模型。针对某型号大型客机供应链进行了案例研究,验证了所提模型和方法的实用性和有效性。

Large civil aircraft has attracted the gaze of many industrial countries for its vital role in the development of economy and science. Generally, the supply chain of large civil aircraft is organized in "Main manufacturer-Supplier" mode to make the product more competitive. Conventional researches about the equilibrium of the supply chain network cannot fully meet the management need of large civil aircraft supply chain. Thus, this paper is to propose new models based on the game theory to analyze the relationship between main manufacturer and different kinds of suppliers and to provide significant guidance for the equilibrium analysis of large civil aircraft supply chain. In the first section, the development characteristics of large civil aircraft in the context of oligopoly competition among supply chains are described. For the encountered difficulties of technology and manufacturing, there exist obvious barriers to enter the industry of civil aircraft. The finite number of civil aircraft manufacturers produce most of the products, representing notable characteristics of oligopolistic competition. Suppliers are divided into three categories according to their equilibrium types: strategic supplier, cooperative supplier, and ordinary supplier. In the second section, different game models are built to obtain diverse equilibriums among different decision-makers. Cournot-Bertrand oligopoly game model is introduced to describe the competitive behavior of main manufacturers with distinct competitive strength. Those manufacturers that are more competitive take the quantity of productq*M as their decision variables, while main manufacturers that are located in low, competitive status tend to gain market share with flexible product pricep*M. Considering the significance of strategic suppliers, the main manufacturer will impose competition rules on them to maintain healthy competition. This kind of suppliers tries to gain more orders qp-i from the main manufacturer by changing their prices pp-i. However, they do not harm each other and form Pareto equilibrium finally. Cooperative suppliers aim at maximizing the overall profits, and the leading suppliers generally choose to make technological breakthroughs together with the following suppliers by sharing critical resources as well as development risk. With the increase of innovation investment, the qualityQc of the product will be improved gradually, which can directly affect the cost and price of products. There exists a cost-sharing coefficient, t which represents that leading suppliers are willing to bear a part of the following suppliers’ cost to promote cooperation. As ordinary suppliers are equally competitive, the main-manufacturer tends to choose this kind of suppliers by using One-Level Sealed Bidding. Ordinary suppliers generally maximize their profits by changing product prices pn-i in a non-cooperative way. The super-bond game model of "The main manufacture-Supplier" during the development of large civil aircraft under oligopoly competition among supply chains can be expressed as bilevel programming with multiple followers. The bilevel programming can transmute into a single-level one with Lagrange-Kuhn-Tucker operators. In the last section, one certain large civil aircraft is studied as a case. There are three supply chains(A, B, and C) producing this kind of product. There are two strategic suppliers, two cooperative suppliers, and three ordinary suppliers in supply chain C. There are four major findings in this study. First, main manufacturers should increase the personalization of the product to avoid homogenization, which can adversely affect their market shares. Second, selfishness coefficient of strategic suppliers should be determined with the careful consideration of the benefits of the overall supply chain and strategic suppliers themselves. Third, Critical technological breakthroughs of cooperative suppliers need cumulative investment and the higher synergistic coefficient, the better. Fourth, there exists an optimal quantity of ordinary suppliers. Too few ordinary suppliers generally lead to a shortage of competition, and excessive ordinary suppliers will result in the waste of sources.