政治治理、管理层权力与国有企业过度投资

Political governance,managerial power and over-investment of state-owned enterprises

党组织参与公司治理是我国国有上市公司治理的重要特征。本文以2011-2016年国有上市公司为样本,研究了政治治理、高管权力与过度投资的关系。结果表明,管理层权力与过度投资显著正相关,政治治理对管理层权力起抑制效应,减小了管理层权力较大企业过度投资的可能性。党委书记或党委副书记兼任董事、党委书记或党委副书记兼任高管分别对管理层权力与过度投资的正向关系产生抑制效应,而党委书记任董事长与党委书记任总经理的政治治理模式则分别与管理层权力与过度投资的正向关系产生协同效应。分组检验结果表明,地方国有企业中管理层权力与过度投资的正向相关关系较之中央国有企业更为显著,政治治理的对于管理层权力与过度投资关系的抑制作用在中央国有企业中比在地方国有企业中更为显著;在2015年新文件发布之后,管理层权力与过度投资的正向相关关系不再显著,政治治理对管理层权力的抑制效应较新文件发布前更为显著,降低了管理层权力较高的企业过度投资的可能性。

The development of state-owned enterprises(SOEs)in China is related to important industries and key areas of the national economy.After experiencing a long period of investment-led economic growth and achieving world-renowned accomplishments,China's economy has entered a new stage of optimizing its economic structure,and the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises has become an important research topic.Due to the existence of“owner absence”and“internal control”in China's state-owned enterprises,the power of top level management(managerial power)has become an important factor affecting investment efficiency.An important feature of China's SOEs that should simultaneously be given attention is,namely,the party committee that participates in corporate governance.How do the members of the party committee and even the party secretary enter the board of directors,or management influence managerial power,and based on that,how should the relationship between managerial power and investment efficiency be adjusted?This paper uses China state-owned listed companies from 2011-2015 as a sample,using the OLS model to study the relationship between political governance,managerial power,and investment efficiency of state-owned listed companies.Richardson's(2006)non-efficiency investment model is used to measure over-investment,and the sum of the control structure and ownership structure is used to measure managerial power;the control structure is based on whether the general manager is a chairman or director as a substitute variable,and the ownership structure is based on the sum of the shareholding ratios of the 2nd-10th largest shareholders/the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder.The party committee secretary can concurrently serve as the chairman of the board of directors or the CEO,or the party secretary or deputy secretary as a director,or the party secretary or deputy secretary as a manager-the five dummy variables serving as substitute variables for political governance.The results of the study show that managerial power and over-investment are significantly positively correlated,and that political governance and managerial power have a restraining effect,which reduces the possibility of over-investment by management with greater power.The party committee secretary or deputy secretary of the party committee serving as a director or manager has a restraining effect on managerial power,which reduces the possibility of excessive investment by enterprises with higher managerial power.The secretary of the party committee or deputy secretary serving as chairman of the board or a general manager has synergistic effects with over-investment,which increases the possibility of excessive investment by management with greater power.The results of the group test show that the positive correlation between managerial power and over-investment in local SOEs is more significant than that in central SOEs.The suppression of the relationship between managerial power and over-investment in political governance is more significant in central SOEs than in local SOEs.Following the release of a new directive in 2015,the positive relationship between managerial power and over-investment is no longer significant,and political governance has less inhibitory effects on managerial power than it did previously.Notably,it reduces the possibility of over-investment in companies with higher managerial power.The academic contribution of this paper lies in the following aspects:First,the study found that higher managerial power will increase the possibility of excessive investment by state-owned listed companies.The conclusions of previous research in this field have been effectively supplemented in the context of the new economic system.Second,political governance and managerial power have a restraining effect,reducing the possibility of over-investment by state-owned listed companies.The suppression of managerial power and over-investment in political governance is significantly stronger in central SOEs than in local SOEs,as well as significantly stronger post-release of the new directive in comparison to pre-release.The conclusions of this paper have important practical implications,with regards to the improvement of governance mechanisms of state-owned listed companies and the construction of party structure.