零售商主导下促进绿色产品需求的联合研发契约协调研究

Study on joint contract coordination to promote green product demand under the retailer-dominance

针对绿色环保产品价格过高,阻碍其成为主流消费品这一现实问题,在绿色经济背景下,探讨零售商向负责绿色研发成本投入的制造商提供不同联合研发契约时的供应链均衡策略和协调问题。以零售商主导的双边垄断型绿色供应链为研究对象,在考虑消费者环保意识、产品绿色度水平、价格等多种因素影响需求的基础上,分别探讨批发价契约、成本分担契约和两部制契约对绿色产品需求、供应链成员利润及渠道利润的影响。结果表明,成本分担契约无法实现供应链成员利润的Pareta改进;一定条件下,两部制契约可以实现供应链成员利润的双赢,并提高绿色产品的市场需求。此外,虽然消费者环保意识的提高并不总是会带来绿色产品市场需求的增加,但却总是会使得绿色供应链的利润提高;并且较高的消费者环保意识将激励企业追求一个较低的绿色成本系数,从而促使企业积极进行绿色技术创新努力。

In the context of a green economy,enterprises,as important participants in human social activities,must resort to green supply chain management practices under pressure of environmental regulation,environmental barriers to international trade,and increasing public awareness of environmental protection.In order to maintain a sustainable competitive advantage in the context of a green economy,many companies are trying to provide products that are more energy efficient and environmentally friendly than their traditional counterparts on the market.However,the improvement of a product’s“green”quality often requires significant investment into environmental research and development,coupled with the existence of the double-marginal effect of the supply chain.The price of green products in the market is often higher than that of their traditional counterparts,which has become one of the key factors hindering the progression of these products towards becoming mainstream consumer goods.This paper focuses on whether different contracts can improve the value of green products while improving the profit of supply chain members and their market demand,in the context of a green economy,and has important implications for the development of production enterprises and the entire green society.This paper takes the retailer-led bilateral monopoly green supply chain as the research object,uses relevant knowledge of game theory to construct a Starkberg game model between manufacturers and retailers,and discusses the retailers’cost of investment in responsible environmental research and development.Manufacturers offer strategies for balancing the supply chain and resolving coordination issues when different joint R&D contracts are available.First,on the basis of considering various factors such as consumer environmental awareness,product“green”level and price,the optimal situation and profit problem is analyzed under the centralized situation and wholesale price contract model.Moreover,the wholesale model is used as a reference for other forms of contract.Second,the paper discusses the impact of introducing environmental R&D cost-sharing contracts,as well as two-part contracts on green product demand,supply chain member profit,and channel profit.Finally,numerical simulation is used to analyze the critical parameters of the green supply chain–consumer environmental awareness,the environmental cost coefficient,the impact of green product demand,and channel profit–in different situations.The results of the research show that the cost-sharing contract cannot achieve the Pareta improvement in the profits of the members of the supply chain,so it cannot be used as an effective coordination mechanism to increase the demand for green products.On the other hand,under certain conditions,the two-part contract can achieve a win-win situation for the members of the supply chain and increase the market demand for green products.Furthermore,although the improvement of consumers'environmental awareness does not always lead to an increase in demand for green products,it always drives an increase in the profit of green supply chains.The impact of the environmental cost coefficient on corporate profits is affected by consumers’degree of environmental awareness;greater awareness will,in turn,encourage companies to pursue a lower cost coefficient and actively carry out green technology innovation efforts.