政府补贴与投资效率的金融错配门槛效应研究

The research of financial misallocation’s threshold effect on the government subsidy to the investment efficiency

本文以战略性新兴企业为研究对象,通过门槛回归模型,检验了金融错配对政府补贴效应的影响。研究发现:(1)由于信息不对称导致的逆向选择和道德风险,政府补贴并非总能促进企业投资效率的提升,即政府补贴效应存在非效率性;(2)金融错配是影响政府补贴效率的主要环境因素;(3)金融错配对政府补贴效果的影响存在显著的非对称倒"U"型双门槛效应:在显著左偏错配区域内,政府补贴具有积极效应,促进企业投资效率的提升;在显著右偏错配区域内,政府补贴的非效率性较为突出。本文研究证实了金融资源配置通过金融加速器对政策引导具有相机调节作用。

This paper takes the strategic emerging industries(SEI) as the research object to examines the impact of financial misallocation on the efficiency of government subsidies through the panel threshold model. The research finds that,(1) Government subsidies do not always promote the efficiency of corporate investment due to adverse selection and moral hazard;(2) Financial misallocation is a main environmental factor affecting the efficiency of government subsidies;(3) the effect of financial misallocation on government subsidies has significant asymmetric inverted "U" type and double threshold effect: if the misallocation in the left avertence areas, government subsidies have positive effect which can promote the corporate investment efficiency;if it in mildly bad areas, Government subsidies have a slight non efficiency effect;but if it in right avertence misallocation areas, government subsidies will not show significant efficiency results, leading to serious investment efficiency losses. This research confirm that the allocation of financial resources has a moderating effect on the policy guidance.