董事高管责任保险能否抑制公司违规行为?

Can Directors'and Officers'Liability Insurance Suppress Corporate Violations?

本文研究董事高管责任保险的引入对公司违规行为的影响及其作用机制。利用2007—2017年上市公司的数据,实证研究发现董事高管责任保险的引入能够抑制公司违规行为。在内部控制质量较差和机构投资者占比较低的企业中,董事高管责任保险对公司违规行为的抑制作用更为显著。董事高管责任保险和内部控制以及机构投资者的交互效应也能显著抑制公司违规行为,这说明董事高管责任保险在治理水平较差的公司中能够发挥“监督效应”,而且还能与公司自身的内部控制和机构投资者治理机制联动共同抑制公司违规行为。此外,董事高管责任保险通过降低企业信息不对称风险来抑制公司违规行为。

This paper studies the impact of the introduction of directors’and officers’liability insurance(D&O insurance)on corporate irregularities and its mechanism.Using the data of listed companies from 2007 to 2017,this paper indicates that the introduction of D&O insurance can suppress corporate violations.Further,in the enterprises with poor internal control quality and low institutional investors,the D&O insurance has a more significant inhibitory effect on the corporate violations.At the same time,D&O insurance and internal control have the interaction effect of institutional investors can also significantly suppress corporate violations,which means that D&O insurance can play an incentive and supervisory effect in companies with poor governance,but also can jointly suppress corporate violations with the company's own internal control and institution investor governance mechanism linkage.In addition,D&O insurance is a way to curb corporate irregularities by reducing the risk of corporate information asymmetry.