卖空机制与企业社会责任承担--基于中国融资融券制度的准自然实验研究

Short-Selling and Corporate Social Responsibility--Evidence from Chinese Market

卖空机制的引入加剧了上市企业财富缩水和声誉损失的风险。动态博弈的视角下,企业有动机通过调整企业社会责任战略来应对卖空机制带来的风险。本文以2008-2017年沪深A股非金融类企业为样本,采用双重差分法检验了中国融券卖空机制对企业社会责任的影响。研究发现:(1)试点企业在卖空压力下既可能基于价值保护动机减少社会责任活动,又可能基于负面事件预防动机增加社会责任活动,而后者占据主导作用。(2)试点企业在卖空压力下会如何调整社会责任投资取决于代理成本的大小,故其本质是代理冲突的产物。(3)试点企业在卖空机制影响下增加社会责任活动的行为降低了股价对负面信息的反应速度,进而削弱了卖空机制的治理效应。

Short selling may have a negative impact on the short-term performance and social reputation of a company.In order to resist the short-selling mechanism,managers may lower the CSR to improve the short-term performance or promote the CSR to cover up their misconducts.Accordingly,the association between Short selling and CSR remains uncertainty.Considering the endogeneity problems,we use DID method to examine the impact of short selling mechanism on corporate social responsibility,taking Chinese nonfinancial A-stock firms listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen Security Exchanges from 2008 to 2017 as researching samples.Our results demonstrate that the short selling mechanism will promote managers to shoulder more social responsibilities based on disguised motivation,which increase the risk of stock price crash,thereby weakening the effect of short selling mechanism.