摘要
以环保类上市公司的面板数据为研究样本,基于委托-代理理论与公平理论揭示独立董事薪酬激励对公司未来绩效的影响。研究结果表明:独立董事薪酬与公司未来绩效显著正相关,且在非国有企业中更为显著;独立董事间不存在薪酬差异时更有利于公司未来绩效的提升;当独立董事薪酬激励不足时,会显著降低经理人薪酬绩效敏感性,从而降低公司绩效,这在非国有企业中表现更甚。
Taking the panel data of listed environmental protection companies as the research sample,and based on the entrustment-agent theory and fairness theory, this article attempts to reveal the influence ofindependent director remuneration incentive on corporate future performance. The research results indicatethat independent director remuneration is positively correlated with the company’s future performance, and itis more significant among non-state-owned enterprises;when there is no remuneration discrepancy among in-dependent directors, it is more beneficial to the company’s future performance improvement;when the inde-pendent director remuneration incentive is insufficient, it will significantly reduce the director’s sensitivity ofremuneration performance, thus reducing the company’s performance, which is more prominent in non-state-owned enterprises.
作者
郭梦娜
程小琴
GUO Meng-na;CHENG Xiao-qin(School of Business,North Minzu University,Yinchuan,Ningxia 750021,China)
出处
《长江师范学院学报》
2020年第1期22-30,121,共10页
Journal of Yangtze Normal University
基金
宁夏回族自治区哲学社会科学规划项目“宁夏中小企业成长性评价及影响因素研究”(17NXBGL01)
北方民族大学商学院研究生创新项目“大智移云时代财会类人才培养实践与探索”(SXY201902)。
关键词
独立董事
薪酬激励
公司绩效
薪酬差异
产权性质
independent director
remuneration incentive
company performance
remuneration discrepancy
nature of property right