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建设工程合同事后补偿引起的负向参照点效应研究

Negative Reference Point Effect Caused by Contract Ex Post Compensation in Construction Projects
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摘要 在契约参照点理论的基础上,考虑建设工程合同事后补偿对初始合同参照点效应的影响及作用机理,构建了合同参照点被中介的调节模型,运用问卷调查法收集数据并进行实证检验。结果表明:初始合同中风险责任条款通过公平感知这一中介促进承包人的积极履约行为,而合同事后补偿会以公平感知为中介,负向调节风险责任条款与承包人履约行为之间的关系,从而诱发负向参照点效应,合同补偿出现激励失灵。建设工程合同设计应注意固化契约参照点,同时保证合同事后补偿的执行情况与预期一致,并在事前补偿与事后补偿间找寻一个平衡。为降低交易成本、提升合同事后履约效率提供理论参考。 Based on the contract reference point theory,contract ex post compensation may exert an impact on initial contract reference point effect.A mediated moderation model of contract reference point effect is constructed to explore the mechanism of this effect.Questionnaire survey is used to tests the model.The results show that the risk liability clause in the initial contract positively promotes the contractor's performance behaviors through the intermediary of fairness perception.The contract ex post compensation takes the fairness perception as the intermediary to negatively adjust the relationship between the contract risk liability clauses and the contractor's performance behaviors,leading to the incentive failure of the construction contract ex post compensation.Therefore,the reference point effect should be solidified in the design of construction contract.Meanwhile,the execution of contract ex post compensation should be consistent with the expectation.This research provides a theoretical reference for reducing transaction cost and improving the efficiency of contract ex-post performance.
作者 严玲 李卓阳 YAN Ling;LI Zhuo-yang(School of Management,Tianjin University of Technology,Tianjin 300384,China)
出处 《工程管理学报》 2020年第1期108-113,共6页 Journal of Engineering Management
基金 国家自然科学基金面上项目(71572128) 天津市高校创新团队培养计划项目(TD13-5019).
关键词 合同事后补偿 风险责任条款 负向参照点效应 承包人履约行为 有中介的调节模型 contract ex post compensation risk liability clause negative reference point effect contractor's performance behaviors mediated moderation model
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