共享经济交易主体信用策略的演化博弈研究

Evolutionary Game Research on Credit Strategy of Sharing Economic Transaction Subjects

【目的】为有效解决共享经济平台频繁出现的违信问题。【方法】构建平台不同监管模式下供需双方的演化博弈模型,考察平台不同模式监管效应的动态演化差异。【结果】平台监管模式的变化影响供需双方的信用策略选择;只有当平台的监管强度突破阈值,方可诱使供需双方选择守信策略;监管效果以“补贴+惩罚”模式最好,“惩罚违信”模式次之,“补贴守信”模式居末。【结论】研究结果有助于指导平台优化监管模式和调节监管强度。

[Purposes]In order to effectively solve the frequent breach of trust in the sharing economic platform.[Methods]The evolutionary game model of suppliers and demanders under different regulatory modes of the platform was constructed,and the dynamic evoluti on ary differences of regulatory effects under different regulatory modes of the platform were investigated.[Findings]It was shown that the change of platform supervision mode affects the choice of credit strategy of both suppliers and demanders.Only when the platform supervision intensity breaks through the threshold,can both suppliers and demanders be induced to choose the trustworthiness strategy.Supervisory effect of"subsidies plus penalties"mode was the best,followed by the penalty mode,and the subsidy mode was at the end.[Conclusions]The research was helpful to guide the platform to optimize the supervision mode and regulate the supervision intensity.