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因果排他性问题研究

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摘要 因果排他性问题,是精神因果的一个重要论题。它因为涉及个体的行为责任,故在心灵哲学界得到广泛讨论。非还原物理主义,否认精神属性可以还原为物理属性,但面临因果排他性问题的威胁。Menzies和Dretske,分别通过构建出兼容的因果模型和分析随附性概念,试图为精神属性的因果作用辩护。但是,由于主体视角及反事实依赖因果概念的不足,他们混淆了因果关系与因果解释关系。实体而不是属性,是因果作用的载体。属性,只有因果解释的相关性。
作者 石东浩
出处 《文教资料》 2020年第5期65-67,共3页
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