基于价格和服务竞争的传统零售商与电子零售商信息分享问题研究

Research on information sharing between a traditional retailer and an e-retailer based on price and service competitions

基于电子商务和信息技术快速发展的现实背景,研究传统零售商与电子零售商在价格和服务竞争下的需求信息分享问题。分别建立传统零售商与电子零售商市场需求信息分享与不分享两种情形下关于定价和服务决策的Nash博弈模型,得到相应的最优定价和最优服务水平策略以及最大期望利润。理论分析和数值分析表明:预测信息对最优定价和最优服务水平的影响是不定的,依赖于模型中参数取值;两零售商的市场份额差异越大、价格竞争越激烈及服务竞争程度越小,越有利于需求信息分享策略或信息分享激励合同的实施。

Based on the reality background of rapid development of e-commerce and information technology,the demand information sharing is studied between a traditional retailer and an e-retailer with price and service competitions.The Nash game models of pricing and service decisions are established in two cases:sharing and non-sharing market demand information between the traditional retailer and the e-retailer.The corresponding optimal pricing,the optimal service level strategies,and the optimal maximum expected profits have been achieved.Theoretical and numerical analyses show that the effects of the forecast information on the optimal pricing and service strategies are inconclusive,which depend on the values of parameters in the model.When the difference of the market shares between the two retailers is larger,the price competition is more fierce,and the service competition degree is less,it is more beneficial to the implementation of voluntary information sharing or the incentive contract of information sharing.