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具有老化效应或学习效应的最大化费用节省的双代理排序博弈

Two-agent scheduling games to maximize cost savings with aging effect or learning effect
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摘要 针对具有老化效应或学习效应的双代理排序博弈问题开展研究。老化效应或学习效应是指工件加工时间随着加工序列中工件加工位置的改变而呈现出递增或递减的函数变化。两个代理合作加工一批工件,每个代理都有一台机器用于加工工件,加工成本定义为各自的完工时间。比较两个代理不同加工顺序的加工费用与初始顺序加工费用之间的差值,即代理加工工件费用的节省值,旨在找到这两个代理加工工件总费用节省的最大值。 The problem of double agent scheduling game is studied with aging effect or learning effect.The aging effect or learning effect is described by an increasing or a decreasing function dependent on the position of a job in the sequence.Two agents have to cooperate in order to process a set of jobs.Each of them has a single machine and his processing cost is defined as the completion time of jobs.The difference between the initial processing cost and the processing cost under processing orders is compared,i.e.,the savings of the cost of processing jobs by agents,so as to find the maximum savings in the total cost of processing jobs by these two agents.
作者 刘鹏 王赛 王小丽 LIU Peng;WANG Sai;WANG Xiao-li(School of Management,Shenyang University of Technology,Shenyang 110870,China)
出处 《沈阳工业大学学报(社会科学版)》 2020年第2期134-137,共4页 Journal of Shenyang University of Technology(Social Sciences)
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(71001074) 辽宁省社会科学规划基金重点项目(L15AGL013) 辽宁省自然科学基金项目(201602545)。
关键词 排序博弈 老化效应 学习效应 双代理 scheduling games aging effect learning effect two-agent
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