小企业加入非对称联盟动机对权力配置与绩效的影响——以水环境治理行业为例

Research on the Impact of Small Firms'Motivation to Join Asymmetric Alliances on Power Allocation and Performance——Take Water Environment Management Industry as an Example

以往有关联盟绩效的研究很少关注企业动机通过权力配置对绩效的多重影响,以及不同动机和权力配置的影响差异。以资源依赖理论和议价能力理论为基础,以中国245家水环境治理企业为样本,研究小企业加入联盟的动机通过感知位置权力与能力权力的配置,对非对称联盟创新绩效和财务绩效的联合效应。结果表明,战略动机通过感知权利互补和平衡促进技术创新;成本动机通过感知权利互补影响财务绩效,但无法通过感知权利平衡影响财务绩效。

Previous studies on alliance performance have paid little attention on the multiple impacts of power allocation on alliance performance based on specific motivation,and whether the impacts are similar or different.Based on the theory of resource dependence and bargaining power,taking 245 water environmental governance enterprises in China as samples,studies the joint effect of small firms'motivation to join the alliance on innovation performance and financial performance of asymmetric alliance through the allocation of perceived position power and capacity power.Empirical research shows that strategic motivation can achieve technological innovation through perceived power complementarity and balance,cost motivation can affect financial performance through perceived power complementarity,but not through perceived power balance.