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国有企业分类改革与高管薪酬 被引量:9

Research on Classified Reform and Incentive Mechanism of Executive Compensation in State-owned Enterprises
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摘要 近年来,党和国家为国有经济提出了“分类改革”的重大战略。那么,国有企业分类改革是否适用于国有企业的高管薪酬体制设计?为此,本文利用CSMAR上市公司数据库,以固定效应模型检验国有企业经济任务、社会任务及政治任务表现对其高管薪酬的影响;并按照国有企业的不同任务目标,将国有企业划分为竞争类(商业类)和非竞争类(公益类),进行分类回归检验。结果显示:国有企业的经济任务表现和社会任务表现均有利于提升高管薪酬,而政治任务表现与高管薪酬无关;分类考核后,竞争性的商业类国有企业的经济任务表现有助于提升高管薪酬,而社会任务表现与高管薪酬无关;非竞争性的公益类国有企业的经济任务表现和社会任务表现均有助于提升高管薪酬。因此,国有企业分类考核对竞争性国有企业的薪酬激励效果优于非竞争性国有企业。本文既为国有企业分类考核的有效性,亦为国有企业高管薪酬考核体系的设计,提供了理论结合实践的学术指导与经验证据。 Based on the data of state-owned listed companies in CSMAR database,this paper uses fixed effect model analysis to test the impact of the performance of economic,social and political tasks of state-owned enterprises on their executive compensation.According to the different task objectives of state-owned enterprises,state-owned enterprises are divided into competitive and non-competitive categories,and the classified regression test is carried out.The results show that:the performance of economic tasks and social tasks of state-owned enterprises are conducive to the promotion of executive pay,while the performance of political tasks is irrelevant to executive pay.After classified assessment of state-owned enterprises,the performance of economic tasks of competitive state-owned enterprises is conducive to the promotion of executive pay,while the performance of social tasks is irrelevant to executive pay.The economic task performance and social task performance of non-competitive state-owned enterprises are helpful to improve the executive compensation.The incentive effect of classified assessment of state-owned enterprises is better than that of non-competitive state-owned enterprises.The research of this paper verifies the effectiveness of the classified assessment of state-owned enterprises,that is,the classified assessment of state-owned enterprises improves the evaluation and assessment system of state-owned enterprise executives,and improves the incentive effect of compensation for state-owned enterprise executives as a whole.
作者 李禹桥 陈林 LI Yuqiao;CHEN Lin
出处 《暨南学报(哲学社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2020年第4期14-25,共12页 Jinan Journal(Philosophy and Social Sciences)
基金 国家自然科学基金面上项目“竞争政策与准入规制的协调机制研究”(批准号:71773039) 广东省自然科学基金面上项目“粤港澳大湾区空气污染与公众健康”(批准号:2020A1515011233) 教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目“我国全要素生产率提升与测算研究”(批准号:17JZD013)。
关键词 国有企业分类改革 高管薪酬 商业类国有企业 公益类国有企业 混合所有制改革 classified reform of state-owned enterprises executive compensation incentive competitive state-owned enterprises non-competitive state-owned enterprises mixed ownership reform
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