无控股股东、内部人控制与内部控制质量

Non-controlling Shareholders,Insider Control and Internal Control Quality

随着我国资本市场的发展,上市公司中出现了越来越多的无控股股东现象。本文基于这一现象利用2007~2017年我国上市公司数据,实证分析了内部人控制与内部控制质量之间的关系。研究发现,内部人控制的公司,其内部控制质量相对较差;当公司股权制衡度高时,内部人控制与内部控制质量的负相关关系更显著;内部人控制与内部控制质量这一负相关关系,在强制实施内部控制规范阶段和强制实施内部控制规范的板块中更为显著。将是否属于高新科技公司,作反面事实推断,验证了内部人控制与内部控制质量的负相关关系。研究结论表明,在我国资本市场中内部人控制会加剧管理层"盘踞效应",损害内部控制质量;高新科技公司内部人控制也会导致内部控制质量较差,内部人控制不是高新科技行业有效的治理机制。

With the development of Chinese capital market,there are more and more companies emerging with non-controlling shareholders.In view of this phenomenon,this paper collects the data of listed companies from 2007 to 2017,empirically analyzes the relationship between internal control and internal control quality.The paper finds that internal control quality is worse in companies controlled by insiders.These negative relationship is more significant when government enforces internal control standards;and these negative relationship is more significant when the balance of ownership is high.By employing a counter-factual framework to check whether companies are hi-tech,the paper confirms those negative relationships.The results show that insider control cannot alleviate the first-class agency problem but worsen that;insider control in hi-tech companies also lower the quality of internal control,and insider control is hardly an effective corporate governance mechanism in hi-tech companies.