一样的科学,不一样的政策——转基因产品标识政策差异的博弈分析

The Same Science,Different Policies:Game Analysis of the Differences in the Labeling Policy of GM Products

转基因产品标识政策对产品定价和消费者购买决策均会产生重要的影响。文章通过综合科学界关于转基因产品安全性的研究发现,目前科学界已经达成共识,食用转基因产品不会比同类传统产品带来更大的健康风险。然而,各国政府制定的标识政策还存在显著差异。针对这一现象,文章试图在博弈论的框架下构建出一个包含政府、厂商和消费者的动态完全信息博弈模型,重点从政府的政策制定依据(政府立场)和消费者群体特征(类型占比和支付意愿分布)两个角度分析政策制定差异的原因。通过模型求解发现:进入政策目标的群体利益和消费者群体特征可以解释政策差异。当政府以消费者剩余最大化作为政策目标时,最优标识政策为自愿标识政策;当政府以厂商利润最大化作为政策目标时,最优标识政策为强制标识政策;当政府以社会总福利最大化作为政策目标时,最优标识政策选择依赖于消费者的群体特征。文章对这一结论进行了解释:自愿标识政策导致了消费者感知到的产品质量差异减小,加剧了厂商间的价格竞争。文章最后就各国标识政策的经验事实进行了对比分析,进而为理解标识政策制定的差异提供了一个相对一致的解释框架。

The GM product labeling policy has an important impact on product pricing and consumer purchasing decisions. Through the comprehensive scientific research on the safety of genetically modified products,this paper finds that the scientific community has reached a consensus that consuming GM products will not bring greater health risks than similar traditional products. However,there are significant differences in the marking policies developed by the government. In view of this phenomenon,this paper attempts to construct a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium model including government,manufacturers and consumers under the framework of game theory,focusing on the government’s policy formulation basis(government position)and consumer group characteristics,so as to analyze the reasons for policy differences. Through the model solution,it is found that the group interests and consumer group characteristics that enter the policy objectives can explain the policy differences. When the government takes the maximization of consumer surplus as the policy goal,the optimal labeling policy is the voluntary labeling policy;when the government maximizes the profit of manufacturers as the policy goal,the optimal labeling policy is the mandatory labeling policy;when the government takes the largest total social welfare as the policy goal,the choice of optimal identification policy depends on the group characteristics of consumers. Finally,this paper explains this conclusion. The voluntary labeling policy leads to the reduction of product quality perceived by consumers,which intensifies the price competition among manufacturers,and compares and analyzes the empirical facts of national labeling policies. This paper also provides a relatively consistent interpretation framework for understanding the differences in labeling policy development.