从弗雷格涵义理论看内、外在主义的和解

On the Settlement Between the Internalism and Externalism from the Perspective of Frege’s Meaning Theory

内在-外在主义之争(I-E debate)关乎现代哲学认识论的核心问题。前者认为确证(justification)仅仅决定于人的内在(internal),而后者指出确证还依赖人之外的因素。从语言哲学和心智哲学视角出发,在语义框架内探讨弗雷格意义理论中内在与外在主义和解的可能。研究认为,因其看重句子的真值条件,弗雷格的意义理论基本属于外在主义的实在论理论,但他独创的"涵义"(sense)概念却扩大了知识和真理的判定方法,使之在某种程度上摆脱了现实世界的束缚。因此,两种主义可能在这一狭窄的视阈内获得短暂的和解。

The I-E debate concerns some of the core issues on epistemology of modern philosophy. Individualism believes that justification is determined by the internal of human brain, while externalism points to some outer factors. From the perspective of philosophy of language and mind philosophy, this article aims to explore the possibility of a handshake between individualism and externalism using Frege’ s meaning theory within semantic frame. This article holds the opinion that Frege’s meaning theory basically belongs to a realism theory of externalism due to its claims on truth conditions.However, the concept of"sense"created by Frege somehow expanded the judging methods of knowledge and truth and therefore liberated them from the shackles of reality. In this way, the two schools of thoughts may achieve a short-term reconciliation in this narrow vision.