考虑损失厌恶行为与谈判破裂的Rubinstein谈判博弈研究

Rubinstein Bargaining with Loss Aversion and a Risk of Breakdown

本文考虑具有损失厌恶行为与破裂风险的Rubinstein谈判博弈。首先构建子博弈完美均衡,并证明子博弈完美均衡的存在性及唯一性。然后分析子博弈完美均衡的性质,结果表明:参与人受益于对手的损失厌恶行为,而因自身具有损失厌恶行为遭受损失;谈判破裂概率对均衡结果的影响取决于贴现因子与参与人的损失厌恶系数;当谈判破裂的概率趋于零时,极限均衡结果收敛于经典的Rubinstein谈判博弈结果。最后建立了与非对称Nash谈判解的关系,其中参与人的议价能力与自身的损失厌恶水平呈负相关性,与对手的损失厌恶水平呈正相关性;参与人的议价能力依赖于谈判破裂概率与出价时间间隔的比值。

Rubinstein bargaining is reconsidered under the assumption that players are loss averse and bargaining has a risk of breakdown. First, a subgame perfect equilibrium is constructed. We show the existence and uniqueness of this subgame perfect equilibrium. Then, the analysis of the subgame perfect equilibrium with respect to loss aversion coefficients and probability of breakdown is performed. It is found that players benefit from their opponents’ loss aversion and are hurt by their own loss aversion. It is also found that the changes of equilibrium outcomes as the probability of breakdown depend on discount factor and loss-aversion coefficient of players. It is further found that the limit equilibrium partition for the probability of breakdown tending to zero is identical to the classical Rubinstein case. Finally, a relation with asymmetric Nash bargaining is established, where a player’s bargaining power is negatively related to his own levels of loss aversion and positively to the opponent’s levels of loss aversion, and depends on the ratio between the probability of breakdown and time lapse between proposals.