基于在线评论的多个竞争制造商和零售商的产品定价策略

Pricing in a Channel Structure with Multiple Competitive Manufacturers and a Co mmon Retailer under Online Reviews

在线评论作为一种产品信息传播载体,越来越受到网上电商及消费者的重视,并在很大程度上影响消费者的购买决策。本文在多个竞争性制造商为在线零售商提供可替代性产品并通过零售商销售给网络消费者的电子商务环境下,研究在线评论信息如何影响网络消费者购买决策及在线零售商和制造商的定价策略。以neo-Hoteling模型为基础,构建了依赖零售渠道在线评论的消费者选择模型,并通过模型求解定量分析了二级供应链结构分散系统下在线评论对多个竞争性制造商及零售商最优决策的影响。得到当制造商基于评论制定最优定价策略时,在线评论对市场竞争强度没有影响,但决定潜在市场大小;各产品的均衡批发价及销售价按一定的比例随评论揭示的该产品与其他产品质量均值之差(正或负)增加或减少,评论信息通常会使制造商因好评而获利,由于评论增加了不同产品需求的不对称性,零售商因而具有更大的调价空间,往往通过提高(降低)占据有利(不利)评论的产品价格获得更高的利润。

Online reviews acting as a carrier of information dissemination receive more and more attention from e-tailer and consumers, which significantly affects consumers’ purchase behavior. In a channel structure with an e-retailer selling multiple substitutable products from competitive manufacturers, the paper studies how online reviews affect consumers’ purchase decisions and pricing strategies of the manufacturers and e-retailer. Through modelling customer choice with online reviews based on neo-Hoteling model and solving Stackelberg game consisting of the manufacturers and e-retailer, we quantitatively analyze effects of online reviews on game players’ optimal pricing strategies. When manufacturers optimize their profits relying on online reviews, the intensity of market competition doesn’t change while reviews determine each product’s potential market size. And each product’s equilibrium wholesale price and sales price increase or decrease in proportion to the difference value(positive or negative) between the product’s quality and mean value of other products’ quality revealed by reviews, and favorable reviews always benefit manufactures. Meanwhile, reviews increase the asymmetry of different products’ demand, thus the retailer has more space to adjust the selling prices, through increasing(decreasing) prices of products with favorable reviews(unfavorable reviews) to earn higher profit.