基于委托代理模型的乳品供应链质量控制策略研究

Research on quality control strategy of dairy supply chain based on principal-agent model

综合运用最优化原理、博弈论和委托代理理论,研究了信息对称、单边信息不对称和双边信息不对称情况下,乳品供应链中乳品加工与销售环节的最优质量控制策略,分析了乳品加工企业和超市实施质量协同控制的条件,并通过数值模拟验证了所建模型的科学性和研究结论的正确性。研究结果表明:当质量预防水平隐匿时,乳品加工企业将采取“质量预防不足”策略;当质量检验水平隐匿时,超市将实施“质量检验过度”策略;当质量预防水平和质量检验水平均隐匿时,乳品加工企业的“质量预防不足”与超市的“质量检验过度”同时存在;合理的合同设计,可促使乳品加工企业与超市实施质量协同控制,采取“预防为主、检验为辅”的基本策略。

Based on the optimization principle,game theory and principal-agent theory,the optimal quality control strategy of dairy processing and sales in dairy supply chain was studied under the condition of information symmetry,unilateral information asymmetry and bilateral information asymmetry.The conditions for the quality control of dairy processing enterprises and supermarkets were implemented,and the scientificity of the model and the correctness of the research conclusions were verified by numerical simulation.The research results showed that when the quality prevention level was concealed,the dairy processing enterprises would adopt the“insufficient quality prevention”strategy;when the quality inspection level was concealed,the supermarkets would implement the“excessive quality inspection”strategy;when the quality prevention level and the quality inspection level were hidden at the same time,the“insufficient quality prevention”of dairy processing enterprises and the“excessive quality inspection”of supermarkets existed simultaneously.Reasonable supermarkets quality inspection level P m could promote the quality control of dairy processing enterprises and supermarkets,and take the basic strategy“prevention first and inspection as auxiliary”.