摘要
商事制度改革是全面深化改革的关键领域,也是优化营商环境的核心内容,必将对中国经济发展产生深远影响。本文考察了商事制度改革对产业专业化的推动作用。首先通过构建地方政府和企业在项目市场上的博弈模型,证明了商事制度改革能够限制政府的干预行为,促进地区产业专业化;然后使用2007—2015年261个地级及以上城市设立市场监管局的时序变量测度商事制度改革程度,利用各城市工业用地出让数据构建供地基尼系数来衡量产业专业化水平,据此做实证检验。结果发现:商事制度改革显著提升了产业专业化水平,设立市场监管局可使专业化水平提高0.031,是其均值的6%、标准差的31%。作用机制上,商事制度改革抑制了政府对行业规模和税收的偏好性投资,促进了企业自由进入市场,降低了投资向部分行业的同质化集中。国有企业对商事制度改革的作用不敏感,仅使用国家资本占比较高行业的样本时以上结论变得不显著。商事制度改革对高技术行业和高契约强度行业的作用更强。使用行政审批中心设立情况、开办企业成本等变量作IV处理内生性问题后,基本结论保持稳健。未来,应进一步加快商事制度改革,并结合地方政府偏好、行业技术和契约强度、企业所有权性质等因素,针对性地提升产业专业化水平,促进中国经济高质量发展。
The commercial system reform is a key area of China’s comprehensive deepening reform,and also the core content of optimizing the business environment.It will surely have a far-reaching impact on China’s economic development.This paper investigates the role of commercial system reform in promoting industrial specialization.By constructing the game model of local government and enterprises in the project market,it is proved that the commercial system reform can restrict the government’s behavior and promote the specialization of regional industry.Using dummy variables of whether established a market authority to measure the degree of commercial system reform in 261 cities in 2007—2015,and the transfer data of industrial land to construct gini coefficient to measure the level of industrial specialization,the empirical results show that:The commercial system reform significantly increases specialization level,and the establishment of a market authority can improve the level of specialization by 0.031,which is 6%of its mean value and 31%of its standard deviation.From the perspective of action mechanism,commercial system reform restrains the government’s preferential investment in industry scale and tax,promotes the free entry of enterprises into the market,and reduces the homogenization and concentration of investment in some industries.The SOEs are not sensitive to the role of commercial system reform,and the above conclusions become insignificant when only the samples of industries with high proportion of state-owned assets are used.The commercial system reform plays a stronger role in high-contract industries and high-tech industries.When variables such as the establishment of administrative examination and approval center and the cost of starting an enterprise are used as instrumental variables to deal with the endogeneity problem,the basic conclusion remains stable.These results indicate that the commercial system reform should be further accelerated,and industrial specialization should be promoted in accordance with the preferences of local governments,the technology and contract intensity of the industry,and the ownership nature of enterprises,so as to promote the high-quality development of China’s economy.
作者
刘诚
杨继东
LIU Cheng;YANG Ji-dong(National Academy of Economic Strategy CASS,Beijing 100028,China;School of Economics,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China)
出处
《中国工业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第4期135-153,共19页
China Industrial Economics
基金
教育部重大专项课题“党的创新理论引领贯穿理论经济学知识体系研究”(批准号19JZDZ002)
北京市社会科学基金青年项目“北京市土地供给侧结构性改革与产业转型升级研究”(批准号18LJC007)。
关键词
商事制度改革
产业专业化
工业用地出让
契约强度
commercial system reform
industrial specialization
industrial land transfer
contract intensity