奖惩机制下政府与建筑垃圾资源化企业的博弈研究

A Study on the Game between the Government and Construction Waste Recycling Enterprises under Reward and Punishment Mechanism

伴随着环境保护诉求的加强和对循环经济的重视,城市建筑垃圾的资源化利用成为我国科研的重要课题之一。建筑垃圾资源化企业既是建筑垃圾再利用环节的关键,也是政府制定建筑垃圾资源化政策的主要针对对象。文章通过构建政府和建筑垃圾资源化企业的斯塔克伯格模型,对双方的博弈进行研究,指出政府应综合考虑自身利益和环境效益,实施合理的奖惩举措,从而实现政府与企业双方利益的最大化。

With the rising of environmental protection demands and the emphasis on circular economy,the recycling of urban construction waste has become one of the important research topics in China.The construction waste recycling enterprise is not only the key part of the construction waste recycling,but also the main target of the government to formulate construction waste recycling policy.By building the Stackelberg model to study the game between the government and the construction waste recycling companies,this paper points out that the government should consider its own interests and environmental benefits in a comprehensive manner and implement reasonable incentives and punishments,so as to maximize the interests of both the government and enterprises.