摘要
为解决火电厂参与直购交易挤占风电上网空间的问题,该文提出了风火打捆参与大用户直购交易新模式。首先,分析了可再生能源强制配额机制背景下,风火打捆参与大用户直购的双边博弈关系。然后,基于动态非合作博弈理论,以风火打捆系统的直购电价和大用户直购电量为决策变量,建立了以双方收益均衡且最大化为目标的博弈模型,并论证了纳什均衡存在性。最后,基于纳什谈判方法,以双方发电和风险损失成本为基础,综合考虑双方满意度,提出了风-火利益分配方法,并通过具体算例验证模型的可行性和实用性。结果表明,风火打捆系统参与直购交易,有利于增加各参与方直购收益,促进了受阻风电消纳,改善了系统灵活性,为优化含大规模风电系统的电力市场模式提供了新方法。
To cope with the problem that the share of gridconnected wind farms is occupied by thermal power plants participating the direct electricity purchasing transaction,a new transaction mode for large consumer direct electricity purchasing,in which the wind-thermal combined generation participates,was proposed.Firstly,under the background of renewables portfolio standards(RPS),the game relationship of the wind-thermal combined generation and large consumer in direct power purchase was analyzed.Then based on the dynamic non cooperative game theory,the game model was established with the goal of maximizing the benefit of each participant,and the existence of Nash equilibrium was proved.In addition,based on Nash negotiation method and considering the power generation cost,risk cost and satisfaction of the wind farm and the thermal power plant,a reasonable revenue distribution method was formulated and verified by specific example under the operation strategy.Finally,the practicability of the model was verified by an example.The results show that the direct purchasing transaction with the participation of wind-thermal combined generation is beneficial to increase the direct purchasing revenues of all participants,promote the wind power accommodation and improve the flexibility of power grid,and provides a new way to optimize the power market model with large-scale wind power system.
作者
黄珊
刘文霞
常源
刘宗歧
HUANG Shan;LIU Wenxia;CHANG Yuan;LIU Zongqi(State Key Laboratory of Alternate Electrical Power System With Renewable Energy Sources(North China Electric Power University),Changping District,Beijing 102206,China)
出处
《现代电力》
北大核心
2020年第2期212-220,共9页
Modern Electric Power
关键词
风火打捆
大用户直购
博弈
利益分配
wind-thermal combined generation
large consumer direct electricity purchasing
game theory
benefit distribution