摘要
特朗普执政后,美国对华战略逐步由“接触”转向“规锁”,中美经贸关系也因此发展到了摩擦频现甚至是冲突对抗的新阶段。美国对华战略规锁本质上是要遏制中国在科技进步和国家实力等方面的崛起,以维护其霸权地位。贸易冲突作为美国对华战略规锁最直接的手段之一,在一定程度上反映了其国内利益集团与党派之间的斗争。特朗普政府为了获得国内政治支持,推出了严重扭曲的对华贸易政策。文章从美国对华战略规锁的视角,运用多重博弈论方法对中美贸易冲突进行了路径选择分析并认为,囚徒困境中“以牙还牙”策略下的博弈双方均实施损人损己的策略,无论采取“以牙还牙”、冷酷触发还是无限拖延,博弈双方的最优策略都是通过贸易谈判实现继续合作;双方只有通过有效谈判,逐步取消加征的贸易壁垒,才能达成协议并获得最大收益。基于博弈结果的情景分析与中美第一阶段经贸协议内容,文章为破解中美贸易冲突困境以及未来防范提供了战略参考和政策启示。
Since the Trump Administration took office,America’s policy towards China has gradually shifted from engagement to confinement,and as a result China-US trade and economic relations have entered into new phase of frequent frictions and even open confrontation.America’s strategic confinement of China essentially seeks to prevent China’s technological advancement and its rise as a power,thereby preserving American hegemony.The trade conflict represents one of the most direct tools that America applies as part of its confinement strategy vis-à-vis China.To a certain extent,this approach reflects the outcome of a contest between America’s interest groups and political parties.As a means of obtaining domestic political support,the Trump Administration introduced a severely distorted trade policy towards China.This article analyzes the China-US trade conflict from a perspective of America’s confinement strategy towards China,applying a finitely repeated game theoretical model.In a prisoner’s dilemma,if players opt for tit-for-tat strategies,they will punish the other party while suffering damages themselves.Regardless of whether they play tit-for-tat,a grim-trigger strategy,or infinite delay,the optimal payoffs for the players is to engage in trade negotiations to enable continued cooperation.Only through effective negotiations can the two players gradually remove additional trade barriers and come to an agreement to maximize benefits.Considering the analysis of the outcome of the game and the content of the first phase agreement between China and the US,this article provides important strategic and policy considerations for overcoming the China-US trade dilemma and preventing future conflict.
作者
马涛
Ma Tao(Institute of World Economics and Politics of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)
出处
《当代亚太》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第2期75-99,153,共26页
Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies
关键词
战略规锁
中美关系
贸易冲突
有限重复博弈
协议
Strategic Confinement
China-US Relations
Trade Conflict
Finitely Repeated Game
Agreement