机构投资者网络团体与公司非效率投资

Institutional Investor Network Cliques and Inefficient Corporate Investment

本文从合谋视角探讨机构投资者网络团体如何影响上市公司投资决策。研究发现,机构投资者网络团体持股比例越大,公司非效率投资现象越严重。在控制内生性问题后,该结论依然成立。此外,机构投资者网络团体拥有足够的动机和能力与管理层和大股东合谋,对他们侵占资金和谋取私利的行为视而不见,致使企业代理成本增加,公司非效率投资现象更加严重。较好的信息和法律环境有助于缓解机构投资者网络团体对公司非效率投资的负面影响。本文结论对深入研究机构投资者网络团体的经济后果具有重要意义。

Drawing on a collusion-focused perspective,this paper seeks to explore the mechanism through which institutional investor network cliques can influence the investment decisions of listed companies.The study essentially finds that the higher the shareholding ratio of institutional investor network cliques,the more severe the inefficient corporate investment phenomenon becomes.This conclusion is maintained even after controlling for endogenous problems.A more detailed analysis indicates that institutional investor network cliques may have sufficient motivation and ability to collude with management and major shareholders,while ignoring their behaviour when it comes to embezzling funds and seeking private profits,resulting in an increase in corporate agency costs,and thus leading to an even more severe phenomenon of inefficient corporate investment.In addition,a better corporate legal and information environment helps to alleviate the intensified role that institutional investor network cliques play in inefficient corporate investment.The conclusions of this paper are of paramount significance in deepening the study of the economic consequences of institutional investor network cliques.