专利授权模式下OEM与再制造商的博弈决策:基于OEM的绿色创新视角

Game Decision and Coordination between OEM and Remanufacturer in the Authorization Mode:Green Innovation Perspective

构建专利授权模式下原产品生产商(OEM)和再制造商之间的Stackelberg博弈模型,探讨OEM的绿色创新努力对决策双方以及供应链系统的影响。针对分散决策下的效率损失问题,设计固定费用T的协调机制,分析不同消费者认可度下的利益协调效果。研究发现,在分散和集中决策下,再制造业务的开展都需要满足一定的条件,而OEM的绿色创新努力有助于降低再制造的启动条件。当满足再制造启动条件时,OEM的绿色创新努力能使再制造商获得更多利润,但OEM自身的利润与绿色创新之间却呈现较为复杂的关系,这种关系使得利益协调机制并不总是成立。具体而言,当消费者认可度低时,OEM和再制造商之间难以达成利益协调,再制造业务的开展受到限制;当消费者认可度较高时,OEM和再制造商可以签订固定费用T的契约合同来保障双方获益,并且随着绿色创新程度的提高,协调契约的效果越显著。

Remanufacturing of patented products is a hot issue in the current intellectual property law due to the difficulty in reaching the balance point between the protection of patent rights and the interests of the public. It is essential for remanufacturers avoid potential infringement and conflict of interests. This paper constructs the Stackelberg game model between the OEM and the remanufacturer under the patented authorization model to explore the impact of OEM’s green innovation on the decision making in a supply chain. In view of the problem of efficiency loss under decentralized decision-making,the coordination mechanism of fixed fee T is designed to discuss the benefit coordination between OEM and remanufacturer. The results indicate that the development of remanufacturing business needs to meet certain conditions regardless of whether it is under a centralized decision or a decentralized decision scenario,and the OEM’s green innovation helps reduce the starting threshold for remanufacturing. When the remanufacturing start-up threshold is satisfied,the OEM’s green innovation will enable the remanufacturers to gain more profits. However,for the manufacturer,the relationship between its own profits and green innovation is so complex that the coordination mechanism cannot always work. When the consumer acceptance for remanufactured products is low,it is difficult to coordinate the benefits between the OEM and the remanufacturer,which restricts the development of remanufacturing business. When the consumer acceptance for remanufactured products is high,OEM and remanufacturer would sign a contract with fixed fee to ensure the benefits of both parties. On the whole,in the scenario of high acceptance,with the increase of OEM’s green innovation degree,the economic value of coordination contracts is more significant.