摘要
“唯有人格才能给予对物的权利,人格权本质上就是物权”,这是学者讨论黑格尔法哲学时常会引用的一句话。出版《法哲学原理》的这段引文把人格权和物权做了等同,但同时也引向一个矛盾人格既赋予物权以基础,人格权又落归于物权,这难道不是一个循环论证或者乞题?分析这矛盾所指向的法哲学实质,即人格及其占有物的辩证关系物的精神化和精神的外化,将有助于我们认识市民社会运作的前提、结构及其伦理困境。
“Only a person can give right to a thing,so that Personal Right is itself Property Right”.This phrase in Philosophy of Right is often cited to present Hegel's Philosophy of Law.The seemingly unproblematic identification of Personal Right to Property Right would cause doubts by a closer look,for the term Person is described to be the foundation of Property Right and the Property Right itself at the same time.Is Hegel begging the question?This article tries to tackle this assumed contradiction,the result of which leads to a deeper understanding of the presupposition and the structure of civil society:the double movement of Spiritualization of Thing and Reification of Spirit.This movement reveals,furthermore,the inner predicament of modern society.
作者
冯嘉荟
FENG Jia-hui(Department of Philosophy, Université Paris 1, Paris 75005, France)
出处
《北京社会科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第5期119-128,共10页
Social Sciences of Beijing
关键词
黑格尔
人格权
物权
社会的抽象
Hegel
Personal Right
Property Right
society in its abstractness