放松卖空管制会对公司避税行为产生治理效应吗?——基于融资融券制度的准自然实验

Does Deregulation of Short Selling Constraints Impose Governance Effect on Corporate Tax Avoidance?——Evidence from A Quasi-Nature Experiment on Margin Trading in China

基于卖空机制对公司行为所具有的治理效应,研究了放松卖空管制对公司避税行为的影响。使用双重差分模型检验发现,成为融资融券标的后公司避税程度显著降低,并且这种治理效应在市场化水平和税收征管强度较低的地区更加显著,弥补了制度环境和税收征管的不足。进一步分析发现,在国有企业和管理层权力较小的公司中放松卖空管制对公司避税的抑制更加显著。研究结论丰富了放松卖空管制研究,同时拓展了公司避税的影响因素研究。

Based on the significant governance effect of short selling system,this paper investigates the effect of deregulation of short selling constraints on corporate tax avoidance in China.Via the difference-in-differences model,we find that the degree of corporate tax avoidance after becoming the subject of margin trading is significantly reduced,and this governance effect is more significant in the areas with low market level and tax collection and management intensity,which makes up for the lack of institutional environment and tax collection and management.Further analysis indicates that a more significant impact of deregulation of short selling constraints on corporate tax avoidance in state-owned enterprises and enterprises whose managers have less power.The conclusion enriches the researches on deregulation of short selling constraints,and expands the influencing factors of the corporate tax avoidance.