摘要
以2011-2015年我国沪深两市A股上市企业为研究样本,对公司的CEO任期与研发投资之间的非线性关系进行了实证研究,并进一步分析了董事网络对两者关系的调节作用。结果发现,CEO任期与研发投资呈现倒U型关系;董事网络中心度正向作用于CEO任期与研发投资的倒U型关系;相对于非国有企业,国有企业CEO任期与研发投资不存在倒U型关系,且董事网络也不存在调节作用。通过进一步研究发现,董事会人力资本的累积会促进公司的研发投资,正向调节CEO任期与研发支出的倒U型关系。
By choosing the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen as a research sample from 2011 to 2015,this paper makes an empirical study on the non-linear relationship between the CEO's tenure and the R&D investment.It further analyzes the role of the director network in regulating the relationship between them.The results show that:CEO tenure and R&D investment show inverted U-shaped relationship.The director network center degree has a positive effect on the inverted U-shaped relationship between them.Compared with non-state-owned enterprises,there is no inverted U-shaped relationship between the term of CEO and R&D investment in state-owned enterprises,and the director network is also no regulatory role.In addition,through further research,it is found that the accumulation of board human capital may promote the R&D investment and impose positive influence on the inverted U-shaped relationship between the CEO's term and R&D expenditure.
作者
王雯
杨蓉
WANG Wen;YANG Rong(Faculty of Economics and Management, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200241, China)
出处
《经济与管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第3期76-90,共15页
Review of Economy and Management
基金
国家自然科学基金项目“大学治理、财务管理和价值增值关系研究”(71573090)
教育部人文社会科学基金项目“公平偏好、参照点效应与国企高管薪酬研究”(15YJC630087)
安徽省哲学社会科学规划项目“董事会文化对企业技术创新的影响研究——以安徽省为例”(AHSKQ2017D41)。
