国企多任务努力成本相关下的高管激励问题

The Multi-task Incentive Problem For SOE Managers Under The Correlated Effort Cost

本文在Holmstrom和Milgrom多任务委托代理模型的分析框架下,建立国有企业的三任务模型,探讨国企多任务努力成本相关下高管激励问题。研究发现,当多任务为互补时,实现企业社会责任目标会对企业经济性任务产生互补促进性作用,有利于经济性任务目标的实现,增加可观测性较高的任务激励会带来互补性任务绩效的提高。当多任务为替代时,实现企业社会责任目标会对企业经济性任务目标的实现产生阻碍作用,不利于经济性任务目标的实现,增加可观测性较高的任务激励会带来互补性任务绩效的减少。当多任务为不相关时,任务间努力成本互相独立,实现企业的政策性任务与其他任务努力成本不相关,应剥离政策性任务。该结论对于国有企业的任务选择与指派,以及存在多任务时的激励机制设计具有重要参考价值。

Under the framework of Holmstrom and Milgrom′s multi task principal-agent model,this paper establishes a three task model of state-owned enterprises,and discusses the executive incentive issues related to the multi task effort cost of state-owned enterprises.It is found that when the multi-task is complementary,the realization of corporate social responsibility goal will promote the economic task,which is conducive to the realization of economic task goal.Increasing the task incentive with high observability will lead to the improvement of complementary task performance.When multi-task is the substitute,the realization of corporate social responsibility will hinder the realization of corporate economic task,which is not conducive to the realization of economic task,while increasing task motivation with high observability will reduce the performance of complementary tasks.When the multi-task is not related,the effort cost between tasks is independent of each other.To realize the policy task is not related to the effort cost of other tasks,the policy task should be separated.This conclusion has important reference value for the task selection and assignment of state-owned enterprises,as well as the incentive mechanism design when there are multiple tasks.