环境治理谁主沉浮:中央还是地方?--基于央地博弈对比的测算分析

Who is the Master of Environmental Governance:the Central or the Local?--Calculation and Analysis Based on the Comparison of the Central-Local Game

文章基于央地博弈工具构建分析中央与地方政府政策博弈走向的理论框架,探讨了中央与地方博弈力量的相对大小对污染治理绩效的影响,以破解"环境治理之谜"。在此基础上,文章运用双边随机前沿方法构建中央政府与地方政府博弈力量的测算模型进行实证分析,基于2003-2015年283个地级市的面板数据,对双方博弈力量的相对大小及其对地区实际污染水平的影响进行了测算。研究结果表明:(1)在环境治理的央地博弈中,中央政府相对于地方政府具有更强的博弈力量,可以解释环境治理绩效的69%,而地方政府仅为31%。(2)中央政府在博弈中所获得的剩余使污染水平相比基准水平降低40. 3%;而地方政府剩余则使污染水平升高29. 5%,央地博弈净效应使得实际污染水平降低10. 8%。(3)央地博弈力量的年度分布具有不平衡的特征,在2003年到2011年,地方政府的博弈力量逐渐增强;而从2011年到2015年,地方政府之前不断增长的博弈力量受到遏制。(4)央地博弈力量亦具有城市分布异质性的特征,地方政府的博弈力量与地区经济发展水平以及信息不对称程度呈负相关关系,与当地的财政自主度呈倒U型关系。文章结论反映了新时代中国特色环境治理模式的制度优势以及国家意志在促进地区节能减排中的重要作用。

In recent years,the central government has increased its emphasis on environmental protection,and successively introduced various environmental protection policies such as the Environmental Protection Law,the Air Pollution Prevention and C.ontrol Action Plan,and the 13 th Five-Year Plan,etc.Moreover,in the assessment of local officials,the central government implement a one-vote veto system for environmental protection,and increased the proportion of environmental indicators to assess and continuously increase environmental control,but the environmental governance of local governments is still not optimistic.According to the "2016 China Environmental Status Bulletin" issued by the Ministry of Environmental Protection,the air quality of 254 cities in 338 cities was not up to standard,with a ratio of 75%,and the proportion of air-good days in 24 cities was less than 50%,and the number of heavily polluted days in 32 cities exceeded 30 days.In addition,according to the Asian Development Bank report,less than 1% of China’s major cities meet the air quality standards set by the World Health Organization.In the 2016 World Environmental Performance Rankings released by top researchers at Yale University and Columbia University,China ranked 109 th out of 180 countries and regions.Based on this,we will have the following questions:under the background of the central government’s efforts to continuously increase environmental management and control,why does regional environmental governance still fail to meet the effects or objectives required by the central government’s environmental regulation?In order to answer the above questions,this paper attempts to explain the "environmental governance mystery" from the perspective of the centrallocal government game,and believes that the local government’s game behavior in environmental governance weakens the effectiveness of the central government’s environmental policy.Under the background that ecological civilization construction is highly concerned,this paper constructs a sequential game model of environmental governance between central government and local government.Through the analysis of the central-local game tools,a theoretical framework for analyzing the trend of central and local government policy games is constructed.On this basis,the realization path of game equilibrium is analyzed.Further,using the two-tier stochastic model to construct the calculation model of the central government and local government game power,based on the panel data of 283 prefecture-level cities from 2003 to 2015,this paper empirically estimates the relative strength of the game power of both governments and their impact on the actual pollution level of the region.The results show that:(1) In the central-local game of environmental governance,the central government has stronger game power than the local government,reaching 69%,while the local government is only 31%.(2) The surplus obtained by the central government in the game reduced the pollution level by 40.3% compared with the baseline level,while the local government surplus increased the pollution level by 29.5%,and the net effect of the central-local game reduced the actual pollution level by 10.8%.(3) According to the annual distribution characteristics of the central game power,from 2003 to 2011,the local government’s game power gradually increased;and from 2011 to 2015,the local government’s previously growing game power was suppressed.(4) From the analysis of urban heterogeneity,the game power of local government is negatively correlated with the level of regional economic development and information asymmetry,and it has an inverted U-shaped relationship with local financial autonomy.This paper also reflects the institutional advantages of socialism with Chinese characteristics in environmental governance and the important role of national will in promoting regional energy conservation and emission reduction.