监事会经济独立性与代理成本

The Economic Independence of Board of Supervisors and Agency Cost

以中国资本市场2007—2016年间A股上市公司为样本,实证检验监事会经济独立性对代理成本的影响以及债权治理和股权治理两类典型外部治理机制的调节作用。研究发现:监事会经济独立性对代理成本具有显著的抑制作用;债权治理会弱化监事会经济独立性对代理成本的抑制作用;随着股权制衡度的提升,监事会经济独立性对代理成本的抑制作用显著下降;监事会经济独立性对企业市场价值具有显著提升作用。文章基于经济独立性视角拓展了监事会治理效率的相关文献,丰富了代理成本影响因素方面的研究,对提高中国情境下监事会监督治理效果具有一定的指导意义。

The article uses A-share listed companies between 2007 and 2016 as samples to examine the impact of economic independence of board of supervisors(EIBS)on agency cost,and the regulating role of two typical external governance mechanisms:creditor governance and equity governance.The study shows the following.Firstly,EIBS inhibits agency cost significantly.Secondly,there is a weakening moderating effect of creditor governance on the relationship between the EIBS and the agency cost.Thirdly,as equity restriction ratio increases,the inhibition effect of EIBS decreases accordingly.Finally,EIBS plays an important role in enhancing the market value of corporate.The article chooses EIBS as a breakpoint,expands the research literature of the governance efficiency of the board of supervisors,enriches the study on the influencing factors of agency cost,and helps us recognize how to enhance the supervisory governance effect of the board of supervisors in the Chinese context.