基于前景理论的反转网络舆情监管三方演化博弈分析

Game Analysis of Tripartite Evolution of Reverse Network Public Opinion Supervision Based on Prospect Theory

[目的/意义]旨在为加强反转网络舆情监管提供参考。[方法/过程]引入前景理论,构建反转网络舆情监管三方演化博弈模型,建立各主体收益感知矩阵,根据复制动态方程分析各种情况下知情者、媒体、政府策略选择。[结果/结论]该模型不存在稳定均衡策略,新闻核实成本、监管成本、处罚力度、公众媒介素养水平均会直接作用于系统演化方向。提出加强政府对网络舆论环境的监管力度,规范网民和媒体行为;加强媒体公信力建设,做好信息"把关人"的角色;提升网民媒介素养,理性表达观点等加强反转网络舆情监管的对策建议。

[Purpose/significance]The paper is to provide references for strengthening the supervision of reversal network public opinion. [Method/process]The paper introduces prospect theory, constructs tripartite evolutionary game model of reversal network public opinion supervision, establishes the income perception matrix of each subject, and analyzes the strategic choice of insiders, media and government under various situation according to the replication dynamic equation. [Result/conclusion]There is no stable equilibrium strategy in this model. The cost of news verification and supervision, the intensity of punishment and the level of public media literacy will all directly affect the direction of system evolution. Finally, it puts forwards some suggestions to strengthen the supervision of reversal network public opinions, such as strengthening the government’s supervision of the network public opinion environment, regulating the behavior of Internet users and media;strengthening the construction of media credibility and playing the role of information gatekeeper;improving netizen’s media literacy to express their views rationally.