电子商务平台中卖方诚信博弈模型研究

Research on Sellers’Honest Game Model on E-commerce Platform

卖方为追求利润快速增长会通过各种攻击策略破坏电子商务平台信誉系统。现有抵御策略大多是通过机器学习等相关技术从过程或结果治理角度实现,但这些方法很难从根本上解决虚假交易问题。针对以上问题,结合博弈论机制设计领域相关知识,从减少造假动机角度出发,提出一种适应于无垄断型电商市场对称演化的卖方诚信博弈模型。模型稳定性理论分析和模拟仿真实验都直观清晰地展示出模型中各参数对电商市场中卖家诚信演化稳定性的影响。实验结果表明,从动机角度出发,采取相应措施能够又好又快地促进更多的卖方选择诚实交易策略。随着演化的进行,虚假交易将最终退出市场。

In order to pursue rapid profit growth,many sellers damage the reputation system of e-commerce platform through various attack strategies.Most of the existing defense strategies are implemented from the perspective of process or result governance through machine learning and other related technologies,but these methods are difficult to fundamentally avoid the occurrence of false transaction phenomenon.In view of the above problems,by combining with the relevant knowledge in the field of game theory mechanism design,this paper puts forward a seller’s honesty game model adapted to the symmetrical evolution of non-monopoly e-commerce market from the perspective of reducing the motivation of fraud.Both the theoretical analysis of the model stability and the simulation experiment clearly and intuitively demonstrate the influence of the parameters in the model on the integrity evolution stability of sellers in the e-commerce market.The experimental results show that,from the perspective of motivation,taking appropriate measures can promote more sellers to choose honest trading strategies quickly and well.As the evolution progresses,there will be no more false transactions in the market eventually.