供应不可靠时下游企业投资上游企业的供应链协调

Coordinating a Supply Chain with Unreliable Supply When Downstream Firm Invests in Upstream Firm

考虑由一个上游企业和一个下游企业构成的供应链,其中上游企业的供货是不可靠的。假定下游企业可以通过向上游企业投资提高其供货的可靠性。首先给出了批发价格契约下各节点企业的最优策略。分析发现:下游企业的投资虽然可以降低双重边际效应,但由于投资所导致的供应链系统利润增加的部分不能完全被下游企业拥有,下游企业投资的积极性可能会受影响;随后,通过引入由收益分享策略和成本分担策略构成的组合策略设计了协调机制,并指出该协调机制能使上下游企业实现双赢。

A supply chain consisting of an upstream firm and a downstream firm was discussed,in which the supply of the upstream firm was unreliable.It was supposed that the downstream firm can improve supply reliability by investing in the upstream firm.Firstly,the optimal decision of each firm under a wholesale-price contract was derived.The analysis shows that although the double marginalization can be reduced by downstream firm’s investment,the increased profit of the supply chain caused by the investment cannotbeobtainedby the downstream firm fully.This may hinder the downstream firm’s investment enthusiasm.Then,by introducing a combined policy of a cost-sharing policy and a revenue-share policy,a coordination mechanism is developed.It is shown that the developed mechanismcan create a win-win situation for both upstream and downstream firms.