考虑信息披露的双渠道供应链两周期定价策略

Two-stage Pricing Model of a Dual-channel Supply Chain with Information Disclosure

在一个含有线上直销渠道的双渠道供应链中,考察当消费者注重产品体验时,信息不披露和信息披露两种模式下制造商、零售商两周期的定价策略。研究发现:消费者对产品体验为高的概率和信息披露对提升制造商和零售商的议价能力都存在正向的作用;信息披露使实体店第二期的需求对前期需求更加敏感,而对第二期价格及成本的敏感性下降;不论信息是否披露,第一期实体店定价总高于网店定价,但当消费者体验产品为高的概率足够大时,网店在第二期可以采用高于实体店的定价策略,且信息披露可以使网店在第二期有更多的可能制定高于实体店的定价;信息披露使得制造商在两期内都可以获得更高的收益,而零售商的收益变化与披露成本有关,且零售商在第一期受益的可能性更高。

The two-stage pricing strategies of a dual-channel supply chain with an online direct channel are investigated.The pricing strategies of the manufacturer and the retailer when information is and isn′t disclosed,are discussed considering consumers′product experience.The results suggest that:the probability that a consumer realizesa high valuation of each product and information disclosure can enhance the bargaining power of both the manufacturer and the retailer;information disclosure makes the second-period demand of the physical store more sensitive to the previous-period demand,but less sensitive to the prices and the purchase cost of the second period;the price of the physical store in period one is always higher than that of the online store no matter whether the information is disclosed or not;when the probability that a consumer realizes a high valuation is high enough,the online store can adopt a higher pricing strategy than the physical store in period two,and information disclosure can increase the probability of that;the manufacturer can get higher profits in both periods because of information disclosure,while the change of the retailer′s profit is related to the disclosure cost;it is more possible that the retailer gets higher profit in period one when information is disclosed.