不确定需求下制造商渠道入侵与信息收集披露激励

Manufacturer Channel Encroachment and Incentive Retailer to Collect and Disclosure Information under Uncertain Demand

研究单个零售商和制造商组成的二级供应链,零售商通过调查获取市场不确定需求信息,而制造商可能建立直销渠道与零售商展开销售竞争。分别在集中决策和分散决策下刻画零售商最优收集、披露策略以及制造商的最优入侵策略;在此基础上设计了促进零售商收集并且披露需求信息的固定报酬激励机制。研究表明:当收集成本、渠道替代率以及固定入侵成本处于合适阈值区间时,需求信息收集和披露会改善双方收益;零售商信息披露可以影响制造商的入侵决策;制造商入侵在一定条件下有利于供应链整体收益,但总是不利于零售商;在制造商率先决定入侵时,零售商接受激励政策可以实现双方共赢。最后通过算例验证了理论的正确性和有效性。

A two-echelon supply chain of individual retailers and manufacturers was studied.Retailer was able to obtain market uncertain demand information through surveys,while manufacturers far from the end market may establish direct sales channels to compete with retailers for sales.The research described the retailer′s optimal collection,sharing strategy,and manufacturer′s optimal intrusion strategy under centralized and decentralized decision-making.Based on this,a fixed-reward incentive mechanism was proposed to promote retailers to collect and share demand information.The results show that when the collection cost and channel substitution rate as well as the fixed intrusion cost belong to the appropriate threshold range,the retailer′s collection and sharing of demand information will improve the profits of both sides.Retailer information sharing can influence manufacturers′intrusion decisions.Manufacturer intrusion benefits the supply chain under certain conditions,but is always detrimental to retailers.When the manufacturer invades,the retailer accepts the incentive policy to achieve a win-win situation for both parties.Finally,the correctness and effectiveness of the theory are verified by an example.