考虑渠道权力结构的O2O供应链合作广告策略研究

Study on O2O Supply Chain Cooperative Advertising Strategy Considering Channel Power Structure

通过建立和比较四种Stackelberg博弈模型,即制造商未参与网络零售平台合作广告计划的博弈模型(N模型)、网络零售平台主导的合作广告模型(P模型)、制造商主导的合作广告模型(M模型)、集中决策的合作广告模型(C模型),研究了渠道权力结构对O2O供应链渠道成员合作广告决策的影响。研究发现:当网络零售平台为供应链领导者时,只有当线上渠道交叉销售效应需到达一定水平,制造商才拥有参与网络零售平台合作广告计划的资格,且当交叉销售效应较大时,网络零售平台的利润将超过制造商;而当制造商为供应链领导者时,制造商不愿意让网络零售平台"搭便车",因此具有较高线上渠道交叉销售效应水平的制造商会选择具有较小引导作用的合作广告方案;集中决策模型中的制造商全国性广告投入及供应链整体利润最大。

In order to study the influence of channel power structure onchannel member cooperative advertising decisionof the O2 O supply chain,four Stackelberg game models were established and compared,namely,none-manufacturer-participation advertising program game model(N model),the online retail platform-led cooperative advertising model(P model),the manufacturerled cooperative advertising model(M model),a cooperative advertising model(C model)for centralized decision-making.The results show that when the online retail platform is a supply chain leader,only when the online channel cross-selling effect needs to reach a certain level,the manufacturer has the qualification to participate in the online retail platform cooperative advertising program,and that when the cross-selling effect is prominent,the profit of the online retail platform will exceed that of the manufacturer;when the manufacturer is the leader of the supply chain,the manufacturer is not willing to"free ride"the online retail platform,so manufacturers with higher online channel cross-selling effects will choose the cooperative advertising scheme with a small guiding effect;the manufacturer′s national advertising investment in the centralized decision model and the overall profit of the supply chain are the largest.