双重股权结构与“日落条款”的入则化补阙

The Perfection of Dual-Class Stock “Sunset Clause”

作为对双重股权结构中特别股转换为普通股情形的约定或法定规则,"日落条款"对双重股权结构和科技创新公司管理中固有缺陷的矫正有着重要意义。但通过对美国证券市场的考察和比较研究可以发现,目前我国科创板上市规则中所规定的"日落条款"仅包括事件型和持股比例型两种,在范围上仍不全面,难以应对长期发展中可能出现的特别股股东管理能力减弱、代理成本增加等问题。在今后的规则完善上,应当注重不同类型"日落条款"的特殊功能,进行制度上的搭配设计。上市规则应强制要求上市公司引入期限型"日落条款",以保障科技创新公司的管理效率。同时,应允许上市公司自主设定双重股权的到期时间,并允许股东在此基础上进行延长,以保证股东在公司利益安排上的自主性,实现科技创新公司治理结构的优化。

As an agreement or legal rule for the conversion of special shares into common shares in dual-class shareholding structure,"sunset clause"is of great significance for the correction of inherent defects in dual-class shareholding structure and management of scientific and technological innovation enterprises. However,through the investigation and comparative study of the U.S. securities market,it can be found that the"sunset clause"stipulated in the listing rules of China’s existing science and technology innovation board only includes events and shareholding ratio "sunset clause",which is still not comprehensive in scope,and it is difficult to deal with such problems as the weakening of management ability and the increase of agency cost of special stock shareholders in developing countries for a long time. In order to perfect the rules,we should pay attention to the special functions of different types of "sunset clauses"and design the system collocation. The time based"sunset clause"should be introduced into the listing rules to maintain the management efficiency of technology innovation companies. Listed companies should be allowed to set the time limit and shareholders should be allowed to extend it,so as to ensure shareholders’ autonomy in the arrangement of corporate interests and optimize the governance structure of scientific and technological innovation enterprises.