控股股东委派非执行董事能抑制盈余管理吗?

Can the Appointment of Non-Executive Directors by Controlling Shareholders Inhibit Earnings Management?

以2012-2017年沪、深两市A股全部上市公司为研究对象,基于盈余管理的角度探讨了控股股东委派非执行董事的公司治理效应。研究发现,由控股股东直接派出的能够体现控股股东意志的非执行董事有效地发挥了对管理层的监督作用,能够显著抑制管理层的应计和真实盈余管理行为,在一定程度上缓解了公司的代理问题。与国有上市公司相比,这一现象在非国有上市公司中表现更为显著。为了控制内生性问题,使用工具变量法进行稳健性检验,研究结论依然成立。

Taking all A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2012 to 2017 as the research object,this paper discusses the corporate governance effect of non-executive directors appointed by controlling shareholders from the perspective of earnings management.It is found that the non-executive directors directly dispatched by the controlling shareholders,which can reflect the will of the controlling shareholders,effectively play a supervisory role over the management,can significantly inhibit the accrual and real earnings management behavior of the management,and alleviate the agency problem of the company to some extent.Compared with state-owned listed companies,this phenomenon is more obvious in non-state-owned listed companies.In order to control the endogeneity problem,the method of instrumental variables was used to test the robustness.