论我国行政强制执行模式的再选择--行政机关的本源性权力与司法机关的延展性权力之博弈平衡

On the reselection of administrative enforcement model in China--The game balance between the original power of the administrative organ and the extended power of the judiciary

关于我国现行行政强制执行双轨制模式的利弊,学界多有讨论。很多学者主张应当将行政强制执行权收归行政机关,但在制度设计上多有不同。在现行国务院机构改革及法治政府建设的大背景下,可将行政强制执行权视为行政机关的本源性权力(应然权力)和司法机关的延展性权力(实然权力),并在此分析框架下,寻求该种权利在应然性和实然性之间的平衡,由此探讨将各级政府的司法行政部门作为行政强制执行机构,并使得司法权回归至监督权的本质。建立以行政机关为主、司法机关为补充的行政强制执行模式,可以改变我国现行行政强制执行模式中司法机关沦为行政机关的执行机关的尴尬现状。

There are many discussions in the academic circles about the pros and cons of the current dual-track system of administrative enforcement in China. M any scholars advocate that the administrative enforcement pow er should be returned to the administrative organ,but there are many differences in the system design. Under the current background of the State Council ’s institutional reform and the construction of the government under the rule of law,the administrative enforcement pow er can be regarded as the original pow er( the due pow er) of the administrative organ and the extended pow er of the judiciary( the actual pow er). Under the framew ork,it seeks to balance the sollen and the reality of this kind of pow er,thus exploring the judicial administrative departments at all levels of government as administrative enforcement agencies and bringing the judicial pow er back to the essence of supervision. The establishment of an administrative enforcement model that is dominated by administrative organs and supplemented by judicial organs can change the current embarrassing situation of judicial organs becoming administrative organs in the current administrative enforcement model in China.