塞拉斯的新经典相容论及其启示

On Sellars’ Neoclassical Compatibilism and its Illumination

日常意义的因果关系不支持决定论,真正的决定论是科学意义的,即依靠相关过程规律可以从先前宇宙状态推导出其之后的状态,据此人的行为是必然的,相悖的行动是不可能的。相比之下,行动自由指人有能力选择和执行自己的行动,从而相悖的行动是可能的。两个观点似乎不相容。塞拉斯延续经典路线,通过重构"决断"概念来重构"因果性"概念,论证作为心理片断的决断可以是自由行动的原因。由此,行动自由的意思是"环境不阻止别的行动",而决定论的结论是"相对于先前宇宙状态,某个行动是物理必然的",两者在话语逻辑中不矛盾。塞拉斯的观点对人工智能的自由意志问题富有启示。

The causality in the ordinary sense does not support determinism, and the real determinism is one in the scientific sense, that it is derivable to the subsequent state of the universe, by a relevant process law, from the antecedent state, thus, a man’s behavior is of necessity and the incompatible one is impossible. By contrast, the freedom of actions means that a man is able to will and act, and, hence, the incompatible action is possible. Those two ideas seem incompatible. Sellars, following the classic approach, reconstructs the concept "volition" by the reconstruction of the concept "causality", and argues that volitions as inner episodes could be the causes of free actions. Thus, the meaning of free action is "circumstances do not prevent one from acting otherwise", and the implication of determinism is "one’s doing something, relative to the antecedent state of the universe, is impossible". There is no contradictory in the logic of discourse. Sellars’ views are very instructive to the free-will problem of artificial intelligence.