基于信息甄别的公益性农业技术推广机制研究

Research on the Mechanism of Public Welfare Agricultural TechnologyPromotion Based on Information Screening

基于农户分化背景研究一种具有外部性的公益性农业技术的推广使用,考虑政府以补贴方式激励农户使用新技术的情形,在政府和农户之间存在信息不对称的条件下,建立一个政府对农户的信息甄别机制,揭示政府在农业技术推广中,如何避免农户的逆向选择行为。结论表明:补贴资金和技术扩散的配置结果取决于信息分布状况以及补贴资金的成本结构;高效率农户由于其信息优势可以获得信息租,而且信息租随着效率级别的上升而提高;在信息不对称的条件下,只有效率最高类型的农户获得了有效配置,其他类型农户的配置都是次有效的,低效率农户获得的配置低于信息对称时的情形。

Based on the background of peasant household differentiation,this paper studies the promotion and application of a public welfare agricultural technology with externalities.The government encourages farmers to use new technologies with subsidies.Considering the information asymmetry between government and peasant households,this paper establishes an information screening mechanism for government to screen peasant households.The purpose of the above mechanism is to reveal how the government avoids the adverse selection behavior of farmers in agricultural technology promotion.The conclusion shows that the allocation results of subsidies and technology diffusion depend on the distribution of information and the cost structure of subsidies.High efficiency farmers can obtain information rent because of their information superiority,and information rent increases as efficiency levels increase.Under the condition of information asymmetry,only the most efficient types of farmers obtain the effective allocation,and the allocation of other types of farmers is sub-effective,and the allocation of low efficiency farmers is lower than that of information symmetry.