银行背景独立董事监督上市公司了吗?--企业债务融资视角

Do Independent Directors with Banking Experience Oversee the Listed Companies? --Debt Financing Perspective

本文基于银行背景独立董事对企业债务融资的影响视角,研究了上市公司独立董事是否具有监督作用。研究发现,在控制了独立董事的其它相关背景后,独立董事的银行背景提高了企业的银行借款率,增加了长期负债比例,并降低了债务融资成本。截面分析研究发现,银行背景独立董事在代理成本严重的情况下更能改善企业的债务融资。在非国有企业,银行背景的独立董事可以提高银行借款率并改善债务期限结构;在国有企业,则降低债务融资成本;相比"四大"会计师事务所审计的上市公司,在非"四大"事务所审计的上市公司,银行背景独立董事更能改善企业的债务融资条件。本文的研究结果通过了一系列稳健性检验,表明独立董事具有监督作用。

Based on the perspective of the influence of independent directors with banking experience on corporate debt financing, this paper studies whether independent directors of listed companies have a supervisory role. The study finds that after controlling other related backgrounds of independent directors, the bank background of independent directors increases enterprises’ bank borrowing rate and proportion of the long-term debt, and reduces the cost of the debt financing. Cross-sectional analysis finds that independent directors with banking experience can better improve the corporate debt financing in the case of serious agency costs.Independent directors with banking experience can increase the bank borrowing rate and improve the debt maturity structure in non-state-owned enterprises, but reduce the cost of the debt financing in state-owned enterprises. Compared with listed companies audited by the "Big4" firms, in listed companies audited by "non-Big4" firms, independent directors with banking experience are more likely to improve the corporate debt financing conditions. The results of this paper have passed a series of robust tests, which indicates that independent directors do have a supervisory role.