摘要
本文以监理方对施工方的制约为切入点,对监理方和施工方在建设工程项目施工质量监控中的行为做出了假设,并就各方的策略选择进行了博弈分析,建立了完全信息静态博弈模型。旨在通过博弈论这一工具,为定量地解决实际问题提供科学的依据,并在此基础上为有效监控工程质量提出合理的建议。
In the paper the supervision party′s constraints on the construction party was taken as the entry point,assumptions about the behavior of the supervision party and the construction party in the construction quality monitoring of the construction project are made,and game analysis on the strategic choices of the parties is done,and complete information.Static game model are established.The aim is to provide a scientific basis for quantitatively solving practical problems through the game theory tool,and on this basis,make reasonable suggestions for effective monitoring of project quality.
作者
韩冬
段宗志
HAN Dong;DUAN Zongzhi(Anhui Jianzhu University,Hefei 230601 China)
出处
《洛阳理工学院学报(自然科学版)》
2020年第1期38-41,共4页
Journal of Luoyang Institute of Science and Technology:Natural Science Edition
关键词
质量监控
制约
博弈分析
quality supervision
restrict
game analysis