学习型消费者情景下企业BBPD策略研究

Consumer learning and BBPD strategy

当前,有关基于消费者购买历史信息的价格歧视策略(BBPD)的研究普遍隐含着一个假设:消费者不具有学习性,即在两期动态模型中,消费者在购买前和购买后获得的基本效用保持不变,消费者并没有从消费中改变产晶的基本效用.显然,该假设与消费者具有不同用户体验的现实不相符.基于此,本文构建了一个双寡头企业的三期动态博弈模型,通过假设消费者具有不同的用户体验,研究消费者在三期模型中的留下和转移行为,对比BBPD和UP(统一定价)两种定价策略之间的差异,探讨企业最优定价策略的战略选择问题.研究发现:企业总是对重复购买消费者制定高价,而对新消费者制定低价;与UP相比,BBPD导致更多的消费者在第二期和第三期转移,增加企业的第一期期望利润,并降低社会福利;当两个企业都能自主选择BBPD和UP时,(BBPD,BBPD)是纳什均衡解,两个企业都获得较少的第一期期望利润,即出现“囚徒困境”结果.

Recent literature on behavior-based pricing discrimination(BBPD)has a common assumption that consumers always have a constant basic utility in a two-period dynamic game model.Obviously,this assumption is far away from the reality that consumers usually have different experiences and update their utility according to the products they purchase.The paper,assuming consumers having different experiences or utilities,studies the effect of customer recognition and BBPD in a three-period game model for a duopoly with a discrete value distribution.The role of consumers'ex ante valuation uncertainty is investigated in a dynamic price competition through the comparison of BBPD with unifonn pricing(UP);the firms'optimal pricing policy is also analyzed under the two different pricing strategies:BBPD and UP.The results are that:the firms always reward new customers and punish old customers;BBPD frequently increases each firm's total profits,but decreases the social welfare;BBPD always drives more consumer switching in both period 2 and period 3,relative to the UP.Prisoners dilemma occurs when the duopoly can choose BBPD and UP simultaneously.